The asymmetry of power between the two partners gives the impression. that the Belt and Road Initiative is China’s one-way. attempt not in Pakistan but globally. with Beijing just imposing an economic corridor all-out. It encourages misunderstandings. Islamabad’s weather partner. The study will focus on China’s stance on dealing. with a variety of Pakistani actors (including political parties, community. and the military) against the backdrop of the changing political climate in Pakistan. and the change in leadership following her 2018 elections. Emphasis on adaptive strategies. Country.
Examining the regional contours:
This white paper emphasizes the importance of adopting a relational approach to study. how the Belt and Road Initiative has evolved on the ground. This should take into account how Pakistan and China negotiate energy, infrastructure. and industrial cooperation projects in the economic corridor. This analysis based on semi-structured elite interviews conducted by the author. during his three rounds of fieldwork in 2015, 2018. and 2020-2021, combining formal reports, statements and journal articles. I’m here. Examining the regional contours of the Pakistan Economic Corridor. Pakistani actors have used agency in significant ways throughout the process. while China Overseas Port Holding Company Chinana. actors have sometimes responded to Pakistan’s key demands.
Developing projects:
The path chosen by the Pakistan Economic Corridor influenced. by partisan politics in Pakistan. The decisions behind the geographic route of the Corridor showed early. on that Pakistani preferences were important in shaping. how the Corridor would develop on the ground. In particular, the choice to priorities projects in Sindh. and Punjab, along with China’s interest in . China Overseas Port Holding Company. in Pakistan’s most economically developed provinces. said it hopes to reap electoral gains in the medium term. It stems from the aspirations of then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his party. Despite initial concerns about the Pakistan Economic Corridor. Pakistan His Teli Quay His Insaf (PTI) was as biased in its use of the corridor as its predecessor. Since taking office in 2018, PTI’s focus on social issues. and economic projects has not deviated significantly from plans previously presented. by the Government of Pakistan for the Pakistan Economic Corridor.
Staggering proposition:
The choice of the Lashakay Special Economic Zone (SEZ). prioritized over other top-ranked regions in the feasibility study (despite China’s strong preference for alternative sites). so China has always been a market leader. It undermines the theory that it is one of the distorting forces. Inappropriate his BRI project. Gwadar development was a priority for Pakistan as well as for China. China’s strategic calculations are often emphasized. but the port of Gwadar was Pakistan’s staggering proposition in his early 2000s. rebranded as a Belt and Road project since 2013. While China involved in Gwadar. The Chinese government sees the port as a strategic access point to the Indian Ocean. Energy projects were initially prioritized by choosing Pakistan. Most of the corridor’s Phase 1 investment is in energy projects. especially coal-fired power plants.
Special economic zones:
This preference for coal was part of Pakistan’s desire to diversify. the composition of its energy market. This goal was also in line with Sharif and his party’s preference for energy projects. to solve the country’s power shortage in order to secure his candidacy for re-election in 2018. Challenges facing special economic zones. Despite China and Islamabad agreeing to focus. and priorities several special economic zones. and China’s desire to move some industries to low-cost production zones. the number of special economic zones has increased. Development progressed slowly. This was the result of a messy bureaucracy and the politicization of these projects.
China’s investment:
Rhetoric about economic corridors often does not match reality. When it comes to providing aid to the Pakistani people. The corridor’s fine language generally has not kept up with the reality on the ground. These projects are often not realized or delayed prologue.The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. China Overseas Port Holding Company is perhaps the most prominent investment corridor for financing China’s infrastructure through the major Belt. and Road Initiative (BRI). Various infrastructure projects. such as road ports, power plants and fibre optic cables 3. The scale and nature of China’s investment. in the economic corridor, officially launched in Pakistan. by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2015. has involved Chinese actors in Pakistan’s domestic politics on an unprecedented scale. Chinese officials insist on the principle of “non-interference.
Internal affairs:
The “internal affairs” of other countries. but since 2013, Beijing and its agents, including Chinese companies. and funds, have criticized by various governments of the federal and Pakistani governments. We are strengthening exchanges with relevant parties. and the United States. 4 These Chinese players have sought to pursue their own interests. and articulate their political and investment preferences. but the domestic political situation in Pakistan has forced them to adapt. Since the inception of the Pakistan Economic Corridor, China’s preference. for centralised decision-making for various investments. and projects have clashed with Pakistan’s preferences, and Pakistan’s political realities. As noted by Senator Sherry Lehmann.
Emerging democratic parties:
A member who convened the Pakistan Senate Select Committee on CPEC. The operational differences between the CPC central government. and the emerging democratic parties. and governing structures in Pakistan are the key to the implementation of CPEC. While many observers have portrayed China’s activities in Pakistan. as a uniform attempt led by Beijing, these projects. and efforts are, in fact, linked to the interests of Chinese players. and to Pakistan’s political and economic interests. This paper compares Pakistan’s approach to the Pakistan Economic Corridor before. and after the 2018 elections when Prime Minister Imran Khan came to power. By doing so, we aim to explore these domestic impacts. This comparison shows. how Chinese players have adapted to the changing political situation in Pakistan.
Economic development:
This paper first explores the compatibility. and possibly disagreement, of Chinese and Pakistani objectives regarding. the corridor and how Chinese players must adapt to Pakistani realities. The authors explored how the key project types identified. by the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC). the main decision-making body in the corridor’s institutional framework. might change course after the 2018 elections. It does this by analysing the arguments about what is. A shift from projects primarily focused. on power generation to a broader set of initiatives aimed. at promoting socio-economic development. This was already foretold by China and Pakistan. in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Long Term Plan (2017-2030). in part because of the consequent pressure exerted on Beijing. by local Pakistani officials. This paper describes these dynamics. and Beijing’s response and coping strategy.
Assesses the implementation:
It then assesses the implementation of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) corridor. one of the key components of the second phase of the economic corridor. The SEZ operates under a Commonwealth Accreditation Board. which includes the Prime Minister of Pakistan, relevant Commonwealth Ministers (including Finance Ministers). Pakistan’s Chief Provincial Ministers. and the Governor of the National Bank of Pakistan. Between Chinese investors and local stakeholders within these SEZs. The author explores how priorities brokered between the Pakistani. and Chinese sides, not simply Beijing-imposed conditions. but It shows what brought the outcome of the negotiations. Economic corridors are forming
Pakistani negotiators:
Prior to 2018, Pakistani politicians. and officials were less willing than their Chinese interlocutors. to conduct detailed negotiations on his CPEC. As Punjab’s chief economist told the authors. Chinese negotiators arrived with well-crafted plans, while Pakistani negotiators did not priorities. The PML-N government, led by then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. was “severely deficient in planning and prioritizing projects. “China Overseas Port Holding Company Plan for Gwadar Port. and Related Infrastructure Projects. in Balochistan Province of Pakistan” and “Master Plan” Terms.11But despite this shaky start. Pakistani politicians quickly identified areas where they could leverage. the proposed Chinese investment to their advantage. and in ways that reflected their own priorities.
Economic corridor route:
Beijing and Islamabad had to reach an agreement on the corridor. route, putting billions of dollars of investment at risk. Making the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor truly patriotic. and equitable initiative would have meant projects. to built in all four of his provinces in the country. although the Pakistani government initially adhered to the rhetoric of an “all-Pakistan” effort. This stance was short-lived. (12) Pakistan’s key stakeholders, including federal. and state politicians and commercial interests. are pressing to secure projects in their regions. Naturally, controversy ensued. Pakistan’s opposition parties and regional parties sometimes opposed. the decision to establish the Pakistan Economic Corridor, but to no avail.
Several political circles:
The Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz saw the economic corridor. as its ticket to re-election. [13] The ruling party has prioritized spending. and investment in the heart of Punjab. which happens to hold the largest number of seats in the National Assembly (14). Punjab and Sindh contain several political circles of parliamentarians of the PML-N party. The deal left Balochistan. and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the cold, while Balochistan governed by an alliance Chinese investments through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor include funding the Dongwon Expressway. and other highways that connect major cities in Pakistan with parts of western China. (Credit: Catherine Adenyi). In this case, the Pakistani government’s preferences happened. to coincide well with the technical concerns of the Chinese interlocutor
Negotiations. The Commission:
As the supreme decision-making body of the corridor.. The JCC is an important forum for these negotiations. The Commission is co-chaired by Pakistan’s Minister of Planning, Development. and Special Initiatives. and China’s Vice Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission. Several joint working groups (Gwadar, Energy, Transport Infrastructure, etc.). meet between JCC meetings to make recommendations to the entire Commission16. The official minutes of the JCC meeting confirm. this alignment between Pakistan’s political interests. and China’s commercial and technological interests. For example, in February 2014. based on the recommendations of the Joint Working Group on Transport Infrastructure. The Joint Coordinating Center established a “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). with Xinjiang, Kunjerab, Islamabad, Lahore, Multan, Sukkur, Karachi. and Gwadar as the first hub city of the he decided on the “principle of linking. the major economic zones with the hub city.
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